My Endorsements

Those who have endorsed my candidacy for a seat on the Washington Supreme Court include:

• The Seattle Times, which is the largest newspaper in Washington,
• The Retired Firefighters of Washington,
• The Seattle Police Officers Guild,
• The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators,
• The Liability Reform Coalition,
• Washington Arms Collectors,
• The Snohomish County Farm Bureau,
• People from all walks of life, like Ralph Cutter -- a Native American and retired Teamsters truck driver whose health insurer sued him to recover over $70,000 in health care payments made to his deceased wife's doctors for medical bills before she died of cancer, public school teacher Ellis Reyes, Seattle orthopedic and plastic surgeon Dr. Alfred Blue, MD, JD, civil engineer Bruce Dodds, P.E., Spokane business executive John Sage, radio host Kirby Wilbur, radio host and reporter John Carlson, and lawyers all over the state.

The Seattle Times said: “we believe he is the best candidate to protect the rights of the people.”

Even those who endorsed my opponent praised my qualifications and capabilities.

For example, the Tri-City Herald said: “the entire board agrees Bond would add a scholarly and forceful dynamic to the court.”

The Yakima Herald Republic said: “we found Bond to be a credible candidate, certainly no extremist.”

The Seattle Post Intelligencer said: “we were impressed.”

Protecting Children

This guest post was written by public school teacher Ellis Reyes, whom I thank for stating the problem from a teacher's point of view.

Apparently basic rights also include protecting predatory teachers from having their criminal behaviors disclosed to the public. In yesterday's decision, Justice Fairhurst voted to conceal the names of teachers accused of molesting children unless they were found guilty of sexual misconduct or some form of disciplinary action was taken. While I am acutely sensitive to the possibility of false accusations against teachers, I find Justice Fairhurst's decision faulty on several counts.

First of all, if a teacher is accused of such behavior, he or she is placed immediately on administrative leave. When that occurs, everyone in the community knows that something is going on and the rumor mill kicks into high gear. The teacher is then and forever persona non grata in that district and to assume otherwise is just naive.

Second, in the world of tenured employment and tight district budgets, isn't it simply easier for a district to ask a teacher to leave quietly than to embark upon an investigation that could cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and turn up nothing? What then? The teacher gets a job in a neighboring district and continues his/her repulsive behavior until the process repeats itself; for thirty years. No sexual misconduct was ever proven and no formal disciplinary action taken so this predator is able to fly beneath the radar for an entire career. As the parent of two young children, this bothers me a great deal.

Finally, as public employees, and particularly as employees placed in positions in which we work directly with children, I believe that the greater good is served by aggressively protecting the children. As a direct extension, teachers' workplace behavior should be a matter of public record. I don't even think it's negotiable. These types of issues should not be investigated behind the scenes. They should be as transparent as possible. If someone is accused, the public should know. If they are vindicated, then the public should know, along with the circumstances surrounding the investigation. If someone was not able to be prosecuted due to a lack of evidence, that is significantly different than someone who is actually innocent and was investigated because a student lied.

Do teachers and other public employees have privacy rights? Absolutely. But do we have a greater obligation to protect students from predators with teaching certificates? I think so.

Fairhurst and Basic Rights?

Justice Fairhurst's ad on the blog horsesass.org claims that she is "committed to protecting everyone's basic rights." But her record would suggest that just the opposite is true, no matter what is meant by the expression "basic rights."

Let's assume that when she refers to her committment to protecting "basic" rights, she means Constitutional rights. The Supreme Court is usually called upon to define and apply the Constitutional rights. They are pretty basic, and as our state Constitution says, a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the preservation of individual liberty and free government.

If basic rights include free speech, which they do, then why did she vote to censor or punish free speech in three cases?

If basic rights include actual notice that the government is going to select your property for condemnation, which they do, then why did she rule that posting an announcement on the agency website was adequate notice?

If basic rights include access to public records, which they do, then why has she consistently voted to conceal public records, and why did she most recently agree to characterize public records as "contraband"?

If basic rights prohibit the government from granting special privileges to corporations, which they do, then why did she vote to approve monopoly rights to two corporations?

And the list goes on. Too often Justice Fairhurst has failed to protect even the most basic of citizen rights. It is time for a change in Olympia. Vote Bond for Justice.

A Meditation on Social Justice

Should a Supreme Court Justice be concerned about social justice? My response is “yes” but first let’s discuss what is meant by social justice.

Some would argue that the expression “social justice” refers to economic redistribution from the rich to the poor. These advocates of social justice favor programs like progressive taxation, low income subsidies, and transfer payments as a means of moving toward a more egalitarian society. The justice in this conception of social justice is demonstrated when all members of society share equally in society’s economic benefits.

Others, while driven by conscience or moral values, are similarly distressed that in a society whose abundance is as great as ours the poor remain trapped and the rich get richer. But these folks believe that the means to achieve social justice are best served when government leaves the market to its devices.

In my view, a judge has no business adopting or seeking to implement either of these approaches to social justice because they represent competing policy decisions that should be made by the people. A judge’s responsibility is to apply the law and Constitution as written, and avoid imposing her or his own personal opinion about what the law should be. How to achieve economic equality, if that is the choice, is a decision to be made by the legislature and not the courts.

I state the issue in its extreme point of view for purposes of my argument because, in some cases, the legislature punts to the courts or elsewhere to make the decision.

But there is another aspect of social justice. In my view, the most important role of the courts is to protect the people from the power of government and vested interests. Not simply power, but the abuse of power. Social justice is advanced when the abuse of power is identified and called to account. Here are three examples that illustrate my argument.

In Tenants v. Seattle Housing Authority, the Seattle Housing Authority adopted a rule that barred its low income tenants from posting political and other messages on the doors to their apartments. So, for example, a poster that said “Impeach Bush” or “Mayor Nickels is a Moron” would have been outlawed. The tenants sued, claiming this rule violated their Constitutional rights to free speech, and the Washington Supreme Court agreed and struck down the Housing Authority’s rule.

My view of it is that a person’s home is their castle, and a poor person’s low income housing apartment was entitled to the same rights of expression as the richest mansion on Lake Washington. And it occurs to me that a poor person may have no better opportunity to express their protest than to put a protest poster on their front door. The poor have very little power in our society, and if all they can do to register their dissent is to show the powerful their middle finger, then I say: you go dude.

My opponent, Justice Fairhurst, joined the dissent who would have upheld the Housing Authority’s rule banning free speech. That approach fails to protect the people from the abuse of the power of government.

In Christiansen v. Ellsworth, a landlord evicted his tenant with a Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate the Premises that gave the tenant 2 business days’ notice. Landlord/tenant law says the landlord has to give 3 days notice and Superior Court Civil Rule 6 says if the time required to do something is less than 7 days then you don’t get to count holidays and weekends. In this case the landlord gave the tenant the notice on the first day of a 3 day holiday weekend, and he counted the three days of the holiday in calculating the statutory three days of notice. That means the landlord did not comply with the law. The trial court and Court of Appeals agreed and they dismissed the landlord's case, and it went to the Supreme Court who reversed, declaring that Civil Rule 6 did not apply and it didn't matter if the notice expired over the holiday weekend.

Justice Fairhurst wrote that the notice to the tenant was “more like a waiting period and not a deadline because it required no action on the part of the tenant.” That's just plain wrong; the notice did require action: pay the rent or get out.

But the bigger problem - it seems to me - is the failure to recognize the relationship of power between these parties: the landlord and the tenant. And in ruling for the landlord, Justice Fairhurst failed to protect the less powerful from the more powerful.

In Ventenbergs v. Seattle, the City of Seattle granted monopoly rights to two national corporations to haul garbage, including construction debris. When the monopolists complained that a local guy with a couple of trucks was hurting their profits, the City shut him down. Our Constitution prohibits granting special privileges to corporations, but our Court wrote an exception into it for garbage, and Justice Fairhurst joined their ruling.

And once again the big and powerful had their way with the small and weak. In my view, social injustice is allowed to fester when the Court fails to protect us from the abuse of power.

In all three cases, application of the plain language of the Washington Constitution or the Civil Rules would have advanced social justice; it really is that simple.

Vote Bond for Justice.

How to Choose Our Judges

Judicial candidates are the wall flowers of the political process. They come to the election dance where voters don't know what to do with them.

We elect our judges in Washington; but voters usually know very little about them, in part, because the position is non-partisan and judges cannot run on a platform of promises about the outcome in future cases. Judicial races are last on the ballot and most folks probably haven't given much thought about what to look for in a judicial candidate.

So what should we look for?

All judges should know the law, possess a temperament to decide cases fairly and impartially, and be of unquestioned integrity. In addition, I offer the following suggestions about how to choose our judges and in particular our appellate and Supreme Court judges.

Our judges should be chosen after considering three criteria: experience, understanding the difference between judging and legislating, and the courage to speak truth to power.

First, a judge should have a broad range of experience in and outside the law. The most important role of the courts is to protect the people from the abuse of power, and if you haven't been around the block a few times, you may not know all the places where the power originates or how it is manifested. The range of experience should show curiosity and a willingness to learn new things. It might include handling all kinds of cases in courts all around the state, experience with both sides of civil and criminal cases, arguing appeals in all of our appellate courts and the Supreme Court, writing for publication, achieving an advanced law degree, and running a small business.

Second, a judge should clearly understand the difference between serving as judge and serving as legislator. The judge's job is to apply the law and Constitution as written and not as she or he wants it to be. The legislator's job is to write the law, which usually represents a compromise of competing factions. The judge should not take it upon herself or himself to re-write the laws or re-adjust the compromise. And if the people have spoken directly by initiative or referendum, then the judge should be especially vigilant to preserve the people's will.

Third, a judge should have the courage to speak truth to power. Very often that means government power; and its reach grows as the concern over security increases. But any institution is capable of abusing its power; and the judge needs to have the courage to call it to account.

Applying these criteria should enable us to choose our judges wisely.

Vote Bond for Justice. http://www.bondforjustice.com/

In Defense of Free Speech

The right of free speech is one of a handful of our most cherished and important rights. And in three opinions, Justice Fairhurst showed a preference for government power to control or punish citizens for exercising their right to free speech. This is one of several areas where our basic values and our approaches to the proper role of government differ.

The three cases involved political speech, protest speech and commercial speech, and in all three cases the incumbent opposed the court’s decisions, which came down on the side of liberty. The consistency of the incumbent’s approach reveals her political philosophy.

In Rickert v. Public Disclosure Commission,[1] the issue was whether the authority of the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) to decide the truth of campaign statements violated the U.S. and State Constitutional protections for political speech. In a race for a legislative seat the challenger said things about the incumbent’s record that were not true, and the incumbent complained to the PDC. The PDC is appointed by the governor, and they regulate campaign finances, a worthy goal. But they also had the authority to investigate the charge that one politician had lied, decide whether the charge was true, and fine the offender. But the offender, who claimed she did not lie at all, argued that she had rights to free speech over which the governor’s appointed commission had no Constitutional authority, and the Supreme Court agreed.

The majority’s opinion came down on the side of liberty. The people can decide which politician is telling the truth; some commission of folks appointed by the governor should not have the power to decide that for us. It’s a simple proposition, and one which the dissent could not accept. Justice Fairhurst joined the dissent, preferring that appointed commissions decide for all citizens which politician is telling the truth.

In Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority,[2] the issue was whether the Seattle Housing Authority had the right to prevent tenants from posting signs on their front doors. The signs included political messages, artwork and sometimes offensive symbols. These are low income housing apartments owned and operated by a Seattle Municipal agency. The tenants sued to enjoin enforcement of the ban and it was struck down as a violation of the tenants’ rights to free speech. The majority again came down on the side of liberty – a person’s home is their castle and they can put whatever slogan they want on their front door.

The dissent, including Justice Fairhurst, would have ruled that the government landlord can censor their tenant’s doors.

Finally, in Kitsap County v. Mattress Outlet,[3] the issue was whether a county had the right to impose its commercial sign ordinance on a retail business that hired people to stand on street corners and waive at passersby while wearing colorful oversized raincoats that displayed the business’s name. The majority ruled for liberty and declared that the county failed to show why a permit for such a sign was required, comparing the raincoat signs to signs advertising yard sales.

The dissent, including Justice Fairhurst, would have ruled that the retailer must obtain the government’s permission before the raincoats can come out.

In each of these cases, Jutice Fairhurstwould have ruled for the government and against a citizen’s liberty rights to free speech. I disagree with that approach.

To preserve liberty vote Bond for Justice.

[1] 161 Wn.2d 843 (2007)
[2] 162 Wn.2d 773 (2008)
[3] 153 Wn.2d 506 (2005)

Right of Privacy Under Attack

The privacy rights of Washington citizens were endangered today in the Washington Supreme Court’s latest assault on our liberty. Fortunately, only four justices joined this remarkable transfer of power from the state to the federal government; and hopefully in this coming election our voters will prevent it from getting worse.

In today’s decision in McNabb v. Dep't. of Corrections,[1] the Court was confronted with a mentally ill prisoner’s refusal to eat or take fluids. The Department of Corrections force fed him with a tube they inserted down his nose, and he sued to prevent them from doing it again, and he claimed that shoving a tube down his nose and forcing him to eat violated his right to privacy under the Washington Constitution.

As the saying goes, hard facts make bad law and, while 8 justices agreed with force feeding the prisoner, the lead opinion in this 4-4-1 decision made bad law in Bond's opinion.

The right of privacy in Washington State was explicitly set forth at statehood in 1889. Our Constitution, Article I, Section 7 says: “no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”

Strict constructionists argue that no similar explicit right of privacy exists under the U.S. Constitution, and it’s true that the word “privacy” is not found in the Constitution. The notion of such a right didn’t even enter the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions until Justice Brandeis wrote about the “right to be let alone” in a dissent in Olmstead v. United States[2] in 1928, which was nearly 40 years after it was explicitly adopted in Washington state.

At the federal level, the right of privacy is assured only as long as the unelected federal judiciary that is appointed by the President preserves it; an amendment to the U.S. Constitution seems unlikely.

In many contexts our state courts have wisely observed that our state Constitution’s protections are greater than those provided under the federal Constitution. Rightly so, in the late 1880’s our state’s founders saw the need to preserve personal liberty from government and corporate interests whose power and influence apparently was unchecked by the 100 year old federal Constitution. And in today’s era of growing federal government intrusion into our lives, privacy rights should be at the top of the list of interests to be protected.

But today’s lead opinion authored by Justice Fairhurst would limit our privacy rights under state law to whatever rights exist under federal law. In a remarkable retreat from liberty, she wrote: "we conclude the protection granted under article I, section 7 in this context is coextensive with, but not greater than, the protection granted under the federal constitution."

I can’t say whether a mentally ill prisoner has a right not to be force fed; assisted suicide remains illegal in this state and the state owed him some duty while he was in their custody. Mr. McNabb began his fast in a mental hospital and clearly wanted to die, but his doctors wanted him to live and believed he couldn’t make a rational choice for himself.

Justice Madsen wrote for four Justices who wouldn’t go along with the lead opinion but concurred in the result, and she makes a compelling case that the issue is settled by Washington’s Natural Death Act.[3] And Justice Sanders’ dissent from the whole thing makes a powerful case for erring on the side of personal sovereignty. These were hard facts.

But I can say that restricting the scope of privacy rights under our State Constitution to whatever the U.S. Supreme Court says it should be is dangerous and unwise.

Vote Bond for Justice in the August primary.

[1] http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.disp&filename=773599MAJ
[2] 277 U.S. 438 (1928), with apologies to purists for the short citation.
[3] RCW 70.122